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Weathering the bills
Ah, New England winters. The sparkling snow. The
frosty windows. The nip in the air. The heating bills. 
With an average daily temperature below 30
degrees from December through March, winters in
New England are long and cold. But more than that,
they are expensive. Prices for most types of fuel are
higher here than in the rest of the country. Factoring
in our long winters means that the typical New
England household pays $350 more in energy bills
than the U.S. average. 
While you can always
turn down the thermostat
and put on a sweater to
save money, there are
limits to how much you
can cut heating costs. It
can be dangerous to live
in an unheated house,
especially for children
and the elderly, and let-
ting the oil tank get too
low can damage the fur-
nace. “The sensible thing
to do is to get oil first,”
says Mae Chapin, who
runs the Hardwick Area Food Pantry in northeastern
Vermont. “But then many families have no money in
their pocket for food.”
Indeed, a 10-degree drop in temperature leads
poor families to spend $67 more per month on fuel
and $16 less on food prepared inside the home in
today’s dollars, according to a recent study by
Jayanta Bhattacharya of the Stanford University
School of Medicine and his colleagues. Meanwhile,
richer families increase their expenditures on both
fuel and food when the weather turns cold, paying
$96 more for fuel and $20 more for food prepared
inside the home.
Those extra costs pinch the poor more, since fuel
costs are a larger percentage of poor families’ bud-
gets and since they have lower incomes to begin
with. To cover the difference, many must reach out
for additional help from the community. Chapin’s
food pantry often serves 10 to 15 percent more fami-
lies in winter than summer. This year, she may serve
even more; the price of residential fuel oil in first
quarter 2003 is expected to rise 18 percent over the
same period last year. —Carrie Conaway
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Are lifetime incomes growing more unequal?
Looking at new evidence on family income mobility
By Katharine Bradbury and Jane Katz
sues in economics
the united states has always taken great pride in its reputa-
tion as a land of opportunity, a place where people have a chance to
move up instead of being trapped where they start. But is this really
the case? Can families who start at the bottom move up, or are most
of them mired at the lower end of the income scale? Is the only way to
reach the top to start there? These questions go to the heart of our iden-
tity as a nation as well as to our social and economic health.
Whether we still deserve our reputation has been called into ques-
tion in light of the fact that over the last thirty years, Americans’ house-
hold incomes have become increasingly unequal (see chart). In the
early 1970s, the change was small; but by the late 1970s, the growing
disparity between rich and poor was clearly evident. The difference
grew even larger in the 1980s and continued to increase into the 1990s.
In 1969, the richest one-fifth of households had about 10 times as much
income, on average, as the poorest households; by 1998, the figure was
almost 14 times. This increasing disparity was a significant reversal of
the U.S. experience between 1950 and 1970, when rapid economic
growth occurred along with a decrease in the difference between the
incomes of the rich and poor. Moreover, the pattern stands virtually
undisputed among researchers. No matter what data are used, whether
looking at individuals or families, incomes in the United States have
become increasingly unequal over the past quarter-century. 
SHOULD WE CARE?
Is growing inequality a significant problem? Should the government
support policies to do anything about it? These are bigger questions
that provoke far greater debate. That debate centers on whether the
increased inequality of year-by-year incomes tells us anything about
the distribution of success and opportunity over longer time periods.
To see why, imagine two economies. Both show the pattern of in-
creasing inequality noted above, but they differ in how that inequali-
ty falls on individual families over time. 
In the first economy, the range of incomes is wide every year sim-
ply due to luck. Some people might have unexpected medical prob-
lems and lose paid time at work, while others win the lottery. Or per-
haps one part of the country has unusually bad weather causing local
crops to fail, while another enjoys ideal growing conditions for local
produce. In any case, this random luck causes a number of families to
experience unusually low or high incomes that year. Next year, other
people or regions will have the good and bad luck and receive high or
low incomes; the rest return to the status quo. Although incomes may
be quite unequal in any given year, families in this economy will ex-
perience a fair amount of mobility year to year as their incomes bounceup and down along with the good and bad
luck. Even if inequality is increasing over
time, families at the bottom still have a
shot at the middle and top each year as
their luck changes. Over the long haul,
the good and bad years for any particular
family tend to cancel out, and all families
have roughly equal lifetime incomes. 
The second economy also has a wide
spread of incomes; however, rather than
being distributed randomly every year,
the differences in incomes are persistent.
Families at the top stay at the top, those in
the middle stay in the middle, and those
at the bottom stay at the bottom. That is,
families experience no mobility relative to
other families. This might occur because
society enforces a class or caste system or
because certain families or groups are dis-
criminated against. Or it might be that in-
dividuals differ along some key dimen-
sions that help to determine their family
income—talent, willingness to work
hard, access to a high-quality education
or a good job—and those differences tend
to persist. In this economy, if inequality is
increasing over time, families at the top
will enjoy both large and growing advan-
tages over those at the bottom, and those
at the bottom will be increasingly worse
off and have no prospect of moving up.
This exercise suggests that how much
attention inequality deserves from voters
and policymakers depends, in part, upon
whether inequality reflects short-run dif-
ficulties that families will get through or
longer-term hardships that trap some at
the bottom. And that determination de-
pends, in turn, upon how much mobili-
ty—year-to-year shifts in position along
the income scale—is also occurring. If in-
creasing inequality, such as that experi-
enced in the United States since the 
early 1970s, is not accompanied by in-
creasing mobility, the short-run disper-
sion in incomes will tend to accumulate
and lifetime incomes will grow increasing
unequal. Some argue that a growing gap
between the top and bottom is not a prob-
lem so long as everyone’s income is ris-
ing in real terms. But to the extent that we
judge our well-being by comparison with
others, then the widening inequality of
lifetime incomes may indeed threaten our
standing as a “land of opportunity.”
HAS MOBILITY INCREASED?
To answer this question, we need to know
how individual families’ incomes change
over time; the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics collects such information. Using
their data on working-age households, we
find no evidence of an increase in family
income mobility since the 1970s. Consis-
tent with earlier studies, we find that mo-
bility held more or less constant from the
1970s to the 1980s. Based on newly avail-
able data from the 1990s, we estimate that
mobility decreased slightly in the 1990s.
Looking at the 1970s, the movement of
families up and down the income ladder
seems unlikely to have been produced by
chance. If we rank families from poorest
to richest and divide them into five equal-
sized groups (quintiles), we find that
about half of all families in the poorest
quintile at the beginning of the decade
were still in the poorest quintile 10 years
later; only about one-quarter of these fam-
ilies made it past the bottom two quintiles
(see tables). Rich families also tended to
stay put—about half of families that start-
ed in the top quintile ended there.
Mobility patterns during the 1980s ap-
pear very similar to the 1970s. About 33
percent of all families moved up one quin-
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Measures of mobility
Income mobility can be measured only by following the same families over
time. Income inequality is measured using a different sample each year. 
Mobility can be defined in either absolute or relative terms. Tracking the
movement of families across a fixed threshold (updated for inflation) mea-
sures absolute mobility. Absolute mobility measures do not change with
changes in the shape of the income distribution. Thus, they furnish an
absolute target against which we can measure progress—for example when
evaluating policies that seek to raise income or consumption above some
purchasing-power level such as the federal poverty line.
Tracking the location of families across quintiles (or any percentile) mea-
sures relative mobility since it follows the movement of each family up or
down the income ladder relative to other families. This is useful since most
people judge their well-being relative to others and because participation in
society depends partly on having access to the goods and services that oth-
ers have. Relative measures also tell us about the degree to which each fami-
ly’s place in the income distribution is permanent or transitory.
A dramatic rise in inequality . . .
. . . has not been offset by an
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tile or more between 1969 and 1979; dur-
ing the 1980s, the figure is 32 percent (see
bar chart). Downward mobility was about
the same in both decades. Although mo-
bility would need to increase over time to
offset the impact of increasing inequality
on lifetime incomes, our calculations sug-
gest that mobility was about the same.
In the 1990s, however, mobility de-
clined noticeably. About 53 percent of
families that began the decade in the
poorest quintile were still there ten years
later (see lower table), several percentage
points higher than before. Families in the
richest quintile were also more likely to re-
main there than previously. 
Overall, about 40 percent of families
ended the 1990s where they began, as
compared with 36 and 37 percent in the
1970s and 1980s, respectively. While
some hoped that increased mobility had
offset the increased inequality in the 1980s
and 1990s, these data provide no evidence
of such an offsetting role. Rather, we find
a slight decrease in mobility, which sug-
gests that the lifetime incomes of rich and
poor families have indeed grown more
unequal.
SHRINKING OPPORTUNITY? 
These findings suggest that those who are
concerned about the future for families at
the lower rungs of the income ladder may
have cause to worry. Compared to 30
years ago, families at the bottom are poor-
er relative to families at the top and also a
bit more stuck there. Mobility alone has
not and is not likely to counteract the
hardships caused by increasing inequali-
ty. Instead, we might want to look more
seriously at policies to even up and im-
prove the possibilities for those at the bot-
tom in order to maintain our standing as
a land of opportunity. S
The authors’ article, “Women’s
Labor Market Involvement and
Family Income Mobility When
Marriages End,” appears in the
New England Economic Review,
Q4 2002.
Up and down the income ladder
Mobility tables are a way of displaying where families start and end in the income
distribution over a period of time. The upper table, for example, which displays out-







still in the lowest
quintile 10 years
later, while only 3
percent (upper
right corner)
made it to the
richest quintile.
The lower table shows that in the 1990s the same figures were 53 percent and 4 per-
cent, respectively. Note that if mobility outcomes were determined solely by chance,
every cell would have an entry of 20—indicating that 20 percent of families that
began the decade in a given quintile would land in each of the five ending quintiles
10 years later.
Several things are worth keeping in mind when interpreting the tables. First, some
movements from lower to higher quintiles are simply the result of higher earnings
that come with age and experience. Second, counting as mobility any family’s cross-
ing of a quintile dividing line (or any other threshold) means that some very small
changes can be included, such as when a family right above or below the dividing
line experiences a small decline or increase in income. For the same reason, the mea-
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top, although they can become much poorer or richer, and shift positions, within
these quintiles. Third, the range between the upper and lower boundaries of each
quintile can vary across quintiles and over time. Indeed, growing inequality pushes
quintile boundaries farther apart; this has made moving up or down a quintile a high-
er hurdle in the 1990s than in the 1980s or 1970s.
note: Data are from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Income is in constant 2000 dollars and is adjusted using the PSID measure of needs,
which takes into account family size and composition. One-person families (persons living alone or with nonrelatives) are included. Families in which
there are no adults below retirement age are excluded.
source: Katharine Bradbury and Jane Katz, “Women’s Labor Market Involvement and Family Income Mobility When Marriages End,” New England
Economic Review Q4 2002, Appendix Table A1 (which also includes the mobility table for the 1980s)
WHERE FAMILIES ENDED UP IN 1979, BY QUINTILE
Percentages sum to 100 across rows
Percentages sum to 100 across rows
WHERE FAMILIES ENDED UP IN 1998, BY QUINTILE
1988–98 DECADE
POOREST SECOND THIRD FOURTH RICHEST
Poorest 53.3 23.6 12.4 6.4 4.3
Second 25.7 36.3 22.6 11.0 4.3
Third 10.9 20.7 28.3 27.5 12.6
Fourth 6.5 12.9 23.7 31.1 25.8
Richest 3.0 5.7 14.9 23.2 53.2
1969–79 DECADE
POOREST SECOND THIRD FOURTH RICHEST
Poorest 49.4 24.5 13.8 9.1 3.3
Second 23.2 27.8 25.2 16.2 7.7
Third 10.2 23.4 24.8 23.0 18.7
Fourth 9.9 15.0 24.1 27.4 23.7
Richest 5.0 9.0 13.2 23.7 49.1
WHERE FAMILIES
STARTED IN 1969,
BY QUINTILE
WHERE FAMILIES
STARTED IN 1988,
BY QUINTILE